APNIC DNS Measurement & Perspectives on 'DNS Health'

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please, not 'state of the art'

- What we do is not 'state of the art'
 - It might be black art. At times it looks pretty artless.
- "organic" systems development
 - Accretion of habits, with occasional bursts of activity
 - Stick with what works, hack on what doesn't
- We believe we could do better
 - Looking for clue, commonalities
 - Metrics?
- Therefore much of this slide pack is self criticism
 - "look on my works, ye mighty and despair"

We do reverse-dns.

Why we see your dialogues on the net (and what it is we see)

PTR shows client transport.

If IPv6, suggests {src,dst} was an IPv6 exchange

SRC ip of DNS query Shows resolver transport APNIC DNS NS for A-P reverses

> Tap here



DNS lookup src IP in PTR request.

Transport chosen by resolver heuristics (may be IPv6 enabled)

Client (might be IPv6 enabled)



(web?) server (likewise might be IPv6 enabled)

Transport chosen by application heuristics

Reverse DNS

- Forward DNS is speculative
 - "if I wanted to go somewhere, where can I go?"
 - ..but does the end-to-end dialogue ever happen?
- Reverse DNS is *introspective*
 - "who was it who just talked to me?"
 - Highly structured namespace, few RR types
 - Potential for deep delegation
 - But its mostly 3 deep (the dots in v4 & in-addr.arpa)
 - Presumption that it mostly reflects {src,dst} pairings which took place.
 - Resolver modeled as belonging 'close' to the destination (server)

"its all just dns"

but some DNS is more 'systems level' than others

Why do people do reverse-DNS?

- ...we're here because we're here (because...)
 - History.
 - Coded into SMTP server/spam filter logic
 - Coded into SSH daemons
 - Log file analysis ?
 - But should see clearer 'midnight' signals for log roll/processing
 - Overall load shape is diurnal (US swamps) but few economies show strong signals (JP exceptional)
- Emerging new uses
 - Geo Priv can leverage reverse-DNS
 - DNSSEC may add value: 'authoritative' name of address

Why indeed?

13 March 2009

apache and reverse DNS hostname lookups

No, no, no, it ain't me babe!

[digital]


Doing reverse DNS hostname lookups on every request in apache (to have those domain names in the log file) is a bad idea as it will slow your server down, everybody seems to agree on that. Yesterday I noticed one of our servers doing just that, despite me not having remembered turning that feature on. Took me a bit of searching and cursing to find the culprit.

There are a few reasons why Apache (or Apache 2) will start looking up hostnames:

- HostnameLookups on somewhere
- checking of allow / deny rules with domains instead of IP ranges, e.g. Allow from www.example.org or Deny from example.org
- a rewrite rule with a condition like RewriteCond %{REMOTE_HOST} www.example.com (the last two I found on this thread)
- update 2009-06-23 according to a post on a "simplywebhosting kb", having Deny from none somewhere (this caused the problem to reappear for me one more time), apparently "none" is not a proper apache directive
- and the winner was: using %h in a LogFormat directive instead of %a (%h will give you the hostname, no matter what
 HostnameLookups says, %a will give you the IP address)

... and now please don't ask me why Apple (or is it Apache 2 at fault?) has the LogFormat with %h in their config on Mac OS X 10.5.

Logging bad guys.. (dshield.org)



Why do people do reverse-DNS?

- The truth is, I don't really know any more.
 - "a fertile area of study" (I'd like to know)
 - What % of internet traffic causes reverse lookup?
- "Organic", perhaps not deliberate?
 - Left in older code, not added to newer code?
 - Now off by default in apache logging?
- For example in bittorrent clients as a value-add
 - Examine your peer set
- My fingers routinely type tcpdump —n now

DNS Monitoring/Measurement

APNIC uses Zenoss for systems monitoring, including DNS systems

- Zenoss is pretty good for base OS/systems view
 - Interface packet counts
 - I/O costs, Disk traffic/volumes, CPU time
 - Good graphing, consistent UI.
- Zenoss not so good for basic DNS monitoring
 - "Check port 53 answer status" is about it
 - Hand-scripted in-addr.arpa specific zone queries
 - Zone serial, zone size checks. (heuristics)
 - Overly simplistic, but we're still learning how
 - NMS has trigger concept, we should use it

Zenoss because ...

- Because we ran nagios and upgraded (organic...)
- APNIC runs general purpose computing systems, web WHOIS mail & ftp and needed an integrated system for its overall OS/Network view.
 - Provides graphing and SMS/alarm framework
- The DNS monitoring in Zenoss is a retrofit.
 - Its not integral, or necessarily monitoring what really matters.
- More work needed here
 - First class event monitoring/SNMP/probe logic into commodity reporting/NMS
 - Triggers. Some rising waves easily detectable

DNS-specific systems monitoring

- 1 minute packet samples, 15 minute cycle (tcpdump) since 2002
- Full packet capture (dnscap) since 2007
- DSC for server/service specific monitoring

Packet samples

- 1 minute packet samples, 15 minute cycle (tcpdump) since 2002
 - Pre-DITL/DSC measures, maintained for backwards compatibility
 - Will be deprecated when relationship to other measurement confirmed, so far, good correlation to basic numbers
 - Now regret not keeping samples.
- Sampling is viable long-term, offers data retention possibilities
 - More bang-per buck over time, if # records matters

Packet capture (dnscap)

- Full packet capture (dnscap) since 2007
 - Deployed for DITL, but left active 24/7
 - Used for IPv4/IPv6 measurements, inter-economy measures
 - Used for what-if and WTF analysis on-demand
 - Ad-hoc (scripted) analysis on demand
 - (eg NZ data shown later)
- Different Visualizations/Analysis being explored

DSC

- DSC for server/service specific monitoring
 - Not integrated into DNS service management (yet)
 - Has alerted staff to problems (see DNSSEC)
 - gratefully acknowledge work of
 - ISC/OARC/measurement-factory
- This is the workhorse. Most value lies here


dnscap issues

- Focusing on the IP abstraction of DNS has 'occluded' other information from our minds
 - We forgot about ICMP. Router stats invaluable.
 - We aren't adequately accounting for fragmentation, or cyclical/series behaviors from clients
 - This is fixable. We need to be more observant in general
- NCAP/PCAP confusion(s)
 - Do we really need ncap and not pcap?
 - What about the low(er) level issues, how do we measure fragmentation, ICMP ...

Interesting behaviors from DITL

- The DNSCAP data is the basis of our DITL input
- What sorts of things are we noticing in the DITL data?
 - Only using own-packet capture at this time
 - Want to generalize, see if commonalities in other samples.
 - Also want to see if assumptions about 3 of 6 NS apply,
 ie get entire NS set for reverse into a DITL
- DITL is long-range, 10,000ft view crown-jewel
 - Looking forward to 2010! (the year of DNSSEC)


Unique IPs in 24h 2008-2009



Address persistence in DNS 2008/2009

- < 1/3 overlap in addresses (re) used to query 1 year later
- Population of DNS query has stable and variant parts
 - Of the order 1.5m distinct addresses doing DNS lookup
- What is the relationship of this subset to the root 5m addresses?
 - (from Sebastian Castro DITL analysis slides, NZNOG)
- (this may be reverse-DNS specific behavior)

How often do people query?



How often do people query?

- Large population of 'occasional' query src
 - Little persistent query, 1-2 hits, then gone
 - Mentally modeled as 'not forwarders' for now
 - Passive classification? What clues are in the query pkt?
- Small population of 'continuous' query src
 - Mentally modeled as 'forwarders'
 - Should be able to see caching behaviors here
- More work needed here

IP transport selection is random?

- Emergence of IPv6 transport use by DNS query sources
 - AAAA transport querying for A PTR and vice-versa
- Transport selection algorithm in resolver is not understood.
 - (by me I mean. I'm sure people here know)
 - Is this 'accidental' V6 usage, or deliberate?
- 6to4, native IPv6 both seen
 - 6to4 has to be very sub-optimal compared to V4
 - No routine DNS (yet) is single-stack IPv6 only NS
- Maybe this is a good thing? Dual-stack emerging?

Who uses IPv6 for DNS transport? A DITL-like look at NZ in 24h (from DSC)

- Last week, What % of NZ dns queries use IPv6 transport?
 - 0.65%. ~ one in two hundred
 - This is comparable to other measures APNIC does of IPv6 transport in DNS, worldwide.
- Last week, What % of reverse-DNS was for ip6.arpa or in-addr.arpa?
 - 0.01%. One in ten thousand was for ip6.arpa.
 - That's the % of NZ addresses queried that are IPv6.


Who uses IPv6 for DNS transport? A DITL-like look at NZ in 24h (from DSC)

- Yes, more DNS flows over Ipv6, than is questions about IPv6!
 - The resolvers selection algorithm for DNS transport is 'sticky' compared to random client IP transport selection algorithm in the browser. Browser strongly de-preferences V6
 - Any NS answering is acceptable. If it answers, use it and stick to it.
- V6 transport for V4 PTR, V4 transport for V6 PTR...
 - It's a dual-stack world.
 - (from NZNOG presentation)

Who used IP to get anywhere? A DITL-like look at NZ in 24h (from DSC)

- In IPv4 1080 allocations visible, from 1234 marked to NZ in delegated stats file
 - -87.5%
 - 1.6m distinct IP looked up as PTR queries.
 - That's pretty high: many economies see less visible use of their IP ranges in global DNS
- But for IPv6 only 21 allocations visible from 46
 - **-** 43%
 - 143 distinct IPv6 looked up as ip6.arpa PTR queries
 - (from nznog presentation)
- This is probably worth collating/tabulating for all economies as a standing report on address usage.
 - Comparable to other OECD data collection inputs

Inter-economy flows in reverse




Inter-economy flows in reverse

- Continuing question from Geoff
 - "yes George, but what does it all MEAN"
 - I wish I knew.
- Intra-economy signal
 - Strong .de .de signal
 - All economies show this. The size of the peak varies massively
- Inter-economy signal
 - Why does .de query about .in IP ranges?


DSC

- Has worked extremely well for us with only one caveat:
 - In-addr is not considered an 'interesting' top domain
- Informs capacity planning, health. Examples:
 - NXDOMAIN, DO bit %, v4/v6 query load
- Has good abstractions for extension
 - 1D-to-2D and 2D-to-<n>D data conversion
- Has good graphing for time series
 - Perhaps some JSON/XML download for offline processing would help with 'what-if' analysis
 - Constant y-axis for inter-graph comparison?

Daily traffic shapes (from DSC)




year-on-year trends (from dnscap)



Observations

- Allowing for time zone differences, dnscap/dsc seem to agree with each other (phew!)
- Strong single 'artifact' required some closer analysis (presented at ESNOG, RIPE)
 - JP 'signal' of DNS lookup
- Other 'clock tick' interval peaks visible
 - Consistent year on year.
 - Against background of constant(ish) load
 - Less 'cron' affected than we thought.
- Inter-site differences
 - Clearly volume, but also some of the artifacts
 - Strong unity of diurnal pattern for the NS (primary) server set, cross-site.

NXDOMAIN from DSC




NXDOMAIN in reverse


- NXDOMAIN of the order 40% of total PTR query load
 - Pre-DNSSEC, no significant cost difference to OK response
- Not a good sign of commitment to reverse-DNS.
 - Value proposition in reverse-DNS always 'weak'
 - But, this can change. GeoIP, SRV, other uses can leverage
- Where is that diurnal sub-signal coming from?
 - Human-centric variances in applications use which causes broken reverse lookup?
 - (some of this is 256.255.abcdein-addr. nonsense)
- NXDOMAIN may be part of our measurement success
 - If its delegated, then the NS response probably caches and we're not directly queried so much for that IP address reverse

What else is DSC telling us?

Response size/ NO DNSSEC (from DSC)




Response size/DNSSEC (from DSC)




DNSSEC costs

- Pre-DNSSEC, response sizes close. (not identical)
- DNSSEC adds significantly to NXDOMAIN cost
 - RRSIG, sigset of NXDOMAIN including NSEC
 - 150byte response becomes 800 byte response
 - (in reverse, OK only jumps 100->400)
- Reverse has fixed-length(ish) queries and replies
 - So this response variance can be cleanly attributed to DNSSEC.
 - Outbound data cost increase, no inbound increase

Key rollover...



Key rollover (in detail)



DNSSEC validation costs

- RIPE still documenting issues, this is W-I-P
- Trust Roll causing problems
 - Clients don't update trust set
 - Mis-behaving clients not caching, backing off
 - 3000 q/s cycles to DNSSEC, DS of parent domains
- Remember: RIPE didn't do anything wrong, followed documented procedures, pre-announced the roll...
 - Root signing will help
 - Until the first key rolls? (KSK roll will expose?)
- New query load, large packets (sigsets)
 - Re-scaling required
 - No goodput improvement until deployment completed

Health/Holistic view of DNS

Health/Holistic view of DNS

- Most queries answered
 - In a timely manner
 - Correctly
- Service scaled to meet demand
- DNS as % of total traffic low
- Adapted over time

- Why are the queries being sent?
- The 40% NXDOMAIN...
- Obviously broken queries
- Impact of DNSSEC
- Resiliency
- DO bit variances

Goodput?

- I know the root ops get far far more of this...
- Significant volumes of dynamic dns update
 - Why do clients think they can do this?
- Significant volumes of 'mangled' queries
 - inet_pton() and inet_ntoa() not being used?
 - Hand crafted in-script DNS lookup of reverse?
- Mis-directed service location requests
 - Ubiquitous s/w (Microsoft, Apple) can do this promiscuously
- What *is* the ratio of DNS lookup to effective e2e?
 - Reasons to believe PTR has strong relationship to actual IP flows
 - (it mostly happens when a dst from {src,dst} receives IP)

Systems-wide redundancy

- Everyone wants secondary NS
 - Everyone winds up using the same secondary NS
- DNS services collapsing onto a small set of anycast providers
 - Leverage common infrastructure cost/efficiency
 - Works, but there are no magic bullets
- Resolver selection/fallback mismatch with client expectations
 - Browser driven demands for semi-immediate response
 - 30 second nserver timeout ubiquitous (untuned) too slow?
 - Parallel queries? First to reply wins?
 - Believe to drive IPv6 transport selection

Is RTT selection a myth?

- Much out-of-region DNS traffic
 - But evidence RTT of alternate NS much better
 - Therefore, why do they persist in coming to long/low RTT NS?
 - Because 'good enough' is coded in the library?
- Emergence of in-browser own-resolver code
 - Doesn't follow the bind 'norms'
 - What did RTT selection really mean anyway?
 - Demands patterns of DNS lookup, cache memory, persistence of data/state
 - Not applicable to the vast mass of 1-2 queries/day sources

What is reverse DNS telling us?

- Information from analysis of PTR query behaviors
 - Exposes {src,dst} relationships
 - Inter-provider relationships
 - Inter-economy relationships
- Rise of IPv6.
 - Tunneling exposed (6to4 address model)
 - 6to4 is 3x the size of the current native IPv6 market in NZ
 - Use of specific MAC (e164) exposed in ff:fe address plan
 - Eg 52% of all 6to4 in New Zealand is Apple
 - Only 43% of deployed IPv6 seen in 24h, against 89% of deployed Ipv4 in NZ
- Interesting, but doesn't inform on DNS health..
 - Except in the wider sense.. It does?

Things we don't do in our DNS monitoring

- We don't yet correlate the NS queries between our NS
 - What query source addresses are active at each node, and do they ask identical questions?
 - Would strongly suggest parallelism in the query.
 - A/AAAA questions might show hunting for transport.
 - Might show botnet or other storms on single queriers
- Requires disk/cputime investments
 - Or a protocol and some neutral combining logic

Things we don't do (cont)

- We don't do any 'qualitative' introspection
 - Zone convergence time as an ongoing report
 - RTT measures (eg leverage RIPE TTM)
- Follow up NXDOMAIN with resource holders
 - This could be part of a 'full life cycle' view of our DNS.
- We should do better DNS triggers in zenoss
 - Might have detected dnskey problem sooner

Things we might do differently

- Do in-server metrics do a better job of some of this?
 - Not yet a common reporting platform?
- Costing measurement/reporting up-front
 - Ongoing capex (disk space mostly)
- Uplifting data to 'home' getting harder
 - Move to the cloud?
 - (easier to do inter-site comparisons if data in one place)

Clue Density Dropping

Additional clue sought!