

中国2010年上海世博会全球合作伙伴
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Lessons Learned from May 19 China's DNS Collapse

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- **What happened**
- **How did we survive**
- **How could this happen**
- **Lessons learned**

What happened- at first sight




- Time
 - 21:00—22:40, May 19, 2009
- Many provinces suffered...
 - 6 reported “almost lost Internet access” province-wide: www, emails, IM... ALL Failed!
 - Others reported “much lower Internet speed”
 - Not only CT, but other Tier-1 ISPs (Unicom, CM) in China all reported large scale Internet access failure
- Survivals remains still...
 - Some provinces see nothing wrong
- Inference 1 : backbone unstable?
 - No relevant link down, no route flapping, no configuration changed
 - So many ISPs all got involved?


- Internet users got few responses from their local DNS servers
- Operators observed their boxes way overloaded...
 - DNS servers: ~100% CPU/Memory usage
 - Layer-4 switches (if exists): the same, plus abnormally high parallel session amount
 - up-connected network nodes: several times larger Incoming traffic than normal
 - source IP addr of the incoming traffic: widely scattered
- Inference 2: DDoS attack against DNS servers?
 - Simultaneous attacking so many servers in every ISP in China ?
 - Few malformed queries were seen
 - No prominent DDoS observed at the time

One of our DNS node


■ memory usage



■ Inbound traffic



■ Parallel sessions
(~20Kqps)



用户至上 用心服务

- baofeng.com became the hottest domain
 - Top4 most-requested names all ended with baofeng.com
 - videodown.baofeng.com,
 - active.baofeng.com,
 - live.baofeng.com,
 - download.baofeng.com

- Servfail messages showed up when trying nslookup baofeng.com names

- The recursive session number reached the limit !!

```
bash-2.05$ rndc status
```

```
...
```

```
recursive clients: 49902/50000
```

```
...
```

```
bash-2.05$ more default.log.20090519-2
```

```
19-May-2009 22:21:13.186 client: warning: client 218.77.186.180#51939: recursive-clients soft limit exceeded, aborting oldest query
```

```
19-May-2009 22:21:13.213 client: warning: client 59.50.182.161#1151: recursive-clients soft limit exceeded, aborting oldest query
```

- Inference 3: something wrong with baofeng.com resolution?

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
- Filter out baofeng.com queries
- Force the cache to response something to baofeng.com queries
 - artifact ip addresses
 - still alive baofeng.com authoritative NS addr.
- Increase the TTL of baofeng.com related RRs
- Decrease the timeout threshold of each connection on layer-4 switches (if exists)
- Peace...

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- DDoS attack!
 - Not against ISP's local DNS name servers...
 - Nor baofeng's authoritative name servers...
 - **But private online game servers !**

How could this happen – playback


So , who are the real victims?



用户至上 用心服务

- What happened
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- **Lessons learned**

- To improve the current DNS architecture to a safer one...
 - Anycast name service(domino effect?)
 - Physically separate recursive function from the cache
 - Strict access control between each boxes
 - Shadow authoritative servers needed?
 - An up-to-date copy of DNS name tree need? at least the main branches?



Cited from R. Dobbins Apnic 28 slide.

用户至上 用心服务

- Always keep an eye on your box!
- High performance boxes may help (to a limit extend...)
- ISPs should seriously concern about not only the DNS systems but
 - Killer Apps
 - Name resolution abusers
 - DDoS attack (against DNS servers)
 - Not only the DNS community but the Internet Community at large
- Caution: **NEVER** blackhole DNS servers unless you are fairly clear about the outcomes !

Thank you!
& comments?

用户至上 用心服务